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ABORTION-RELATED DISCLOSURES AND HOW THE
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN INSTITUTE A NOVEL
AND INNOVATIVE PREGNANCY DISCLOSURE
MARY L. SCOTT ∗
Nearly half of pregnancies in the United States, more than two million
pregnancies every year, are unintended.1 In 2010, fifty-eight percent, or
more than 70,000, of total pregnancies in Maryland were unintended. 2
When an unintended pregnancy occurs, the pregnant person 3 may not understand their options regarding the pregnancy or know about the availability of various pregnancy-related resources. There are many stories of pregnant people who did not terminate or delayed terminating their pregnancy
due to inaccurate information. Sharon ended up at a crisis pregnancy center
after “search[ing] the internet for ‘free pregnancy test’ and ‘free ultrasound.’” 4 Following the ultrasound, she was told her pregnancy was too far
along to get an abortion; however, later at an abortion clinic 5 she discovered
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1. GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES
(2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us.pdf.
2. KATHRYN KOST, GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY RATES AT THE STATE
LEVEL:
ESTIMATES
FOR
2010
AND
TRENDS
SINCE
2002
8
(2015),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/stateup10.pdf.
3. While the majority of people who become pregnant identify as female, I use the term
pregnant people in this Comment to include those who do not identify as female but may still become pregnant either intentionally or unintentionally. However, pregnancy has long been considered a women’s rights issue and I ask the reader to keep the history of the oppression of women
and the fight for women’s rights in mind.
4. Brief for 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17–18, NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 161140).
5. Abortion clinics differ from crisis pregnancy centers because they abortion clinics provide abortion procedures, while crisis pregnancy centers are faith-based groups that wish to discourage people from seeking abortions. Laura Bassett, What Are “Crisis Pregnancy Centers,”
and Why Does the Supreme Court Care About Them?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/crisis-pregancy-centers-supremecourt_us_5a09f40ae4b0bc648a0d13a2. There are reports that crisis pregnancy centers transmit
biased information to those seeking assistance. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, THE TRUTH
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she was within the legal timeframe to elect an abortion. 6 Cherisse called a
number on an advertisement that said, “Need abortion? Call us.” 7 After attending two separate appointments, she was incorrectly informed that it was
too late for an abortion because “the procedure would perforate her uterus,
and she would never be able to have children” despite the fact that she was
still in the first trimester.8 Cherisse reluctantly decided not to terminate the
pregnancy since she wanted to be a mom someday. 9
Additionally, receiving inaccurate medical information regarding
pregnancy can endanger the lives of pregnant people.10 Sarah went to a crisis pregnancy center after taking a home pregnancy test but was told she
was not pregnant and must have miscarried. 11 In fact, it was an ectopic
pregnancy and Sarah needed emergency surgery to remove the fertilized
egg and the fallopian tube in which it was located, putting her life and future fertility at risk. 12 These stories and countless others illustrate how inaccurate information regarding pregnancy can cause many unwanted and
unnecessary consequences.
Informed consent is required for all medical procedures, 13 but this requirement has been obfuscated with regard to abortion. 14 While disclosure
of the risks of a particular procedure is a routine part of informed consent,
the United States Supreme Court’s past rulings allow a state to intermingle
its interest in protecting human life with abortion-related informed consent
disclosures. 15 Some states jumped on this opportunity to introduce scientifABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2017), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/6.-The-Truth-About-Crisis-Pregnancy-Centers.pdf.
6. Brief for 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations, supra
note 4, at 17–18.
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. Abortions are legal in most states until the point of viability, which is between twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks after the pregnant person’s last menstrual period. State Bans on
INST.
(Mar.
1,
2019),
Abortion
Throughout
Pregnancy,
GUTTMACHER
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions. While some states
have pushed this standard back to twenty weeks, the first trimester still ends significantly before
this point of viability, at twelve weeks. Id.; Stages of Pregnancy, OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/youre-pregnant-now-what/stagespregnancy.
9. Brief for 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations, supra
note 4, at 19–20.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id.
12. Id. An ectopic pregnancy occurs when a fertilized egg implants outside of the uterus,
usually in a fallopian tube. Frequently Asked Questions FAQ155 Pregnancy, AM. COLL. OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Feb. 2018), https://www.acog.org/-/media/ForPatients/faq155.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20190702T0106394685.
13. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the concept
of informed consent for medical procedures).
14. See infra Section I.B.
15. See infra Section I.B.
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ically invalid information, such as abortion increases the possibility of suicide 16 and various cancers, 17 into their informed consent requirements. 18
Additionally, some states require abortion providers to show pregnant people a sonogram image of the fetus and describe the various aspects of the
image or amplify the sound of the heartbeat. 19 The Supreme Court declined
opportunities to strike down these various disclosures for abortion procedures. 20
However, in 2018, the Court struck down a California law, the FACT
Act, 21 requiring a notice to be posted in the waiting room of crisis pregnancy centers stating that many pregnancy services, including abortion, were
offered by the state for little or no cost.22 When the FACT Act became law
in California, a number of crisis pregnancy center organizations, such as the
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”), protested and
asked the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
for a preliminary injunction. 23 While the history of abortion-related disclosures suggested the FACT Act would stand, the Court struck down the law

16. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011) (“A consent to an abortion is not voluntary and informed, unless . . . the physician provides that pregnant [person]
with . . . [a] description of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant
risk factors to which the pregnant [person] would be subjected, including . . . [i]ncreased risk of
suicide ideation and suicide . . . .”).
17. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(3) (West 2018) (“At least 24 hours before the abortion the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring physician has informed the [person] in writing of . . . a description of risks related to the proposed abortion method, including . . .
risk of breast cancer . . . .”).
18. As of February 1, 2019, five states mandate counseling including information regarding a
supposed link between breast cancer and abortion, and eight states mandate counseling including
information regarding a supposed link between negative psychological effects and abortion. An
INST.
(Feb.
1,
2019),
Overview
of
Abortion
Laws,
GUTTMACHER
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws. The American Cancer
Society reports that there is no link between breast cancer and abortion. Abortion and Breast
Cancer Risk, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (June 19, 2014), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/medical-treatments/abortion-and-breast-cancer-risk.html. Similarly, Guttmacher Institute
reviewed several studies regarding feelings after having an abortion and found no evidence of later mental health problems. Emotional and Mental Health After Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/perspectives50/emotional-and-mental-health-after-abortion (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).
19. As of February 1, 2019, three states require an abortion provider to display and describe
an ultrasound image; nine additional states require the provider to perform the ultrasound and offer the option to view the image. Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1,
2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound.
20. These abortion-related disclosures began to emerge in state laws following Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Supreme Court allowed a twenty-four-hour waiting period to stand as an acceptable requirement of informed consent. 505 U.S.
833, 885 (1992). The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to any of the cases discussed in
this Comment except NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
21. 2015 Cal. Stat. 5351.
22. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
23. Id. at 2370.
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while other abortion-related disclosure requirements, such as the requirements discussed above, stand in thirty-seven states. 24
This Comment will first examine the history of abortion-related disclosures since the legalization of abortion in 1973. 25 Specifically, it will review the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey 26 and the subsequent Circuit Court split regarding whether Casey established a test for future abortion-related disclosures. 27 In particular, this
Comment will discuss recent cases in which Baltimore, Maryland and the
State of California attempted to reverse the paradigm and impose disclosure
requirements on crisis pregnancy centers before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 28 before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in NIFLA v. Harris, 29 and finally before the
Supreme Court in NIFLA v. Becerra. 30 This Comment will argue that due
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra and in order to effectively educate the pregnant population of the state, the Maryland General Assembly
should develop a novel Pregnancy Disclosure—the substance of which this
Comment proposes—to inform pregnant people of all their options at the
first possible opportunity, including available resources and both abortion
and childbirth risks. 31
I. BACKGROUND
Since the legalization of abortion, constant legal challenges arise regarding many aspects of this right. The Supreme Court’s allowance for
abortion-related disclosures continues to evolve over time. Section I.A discusses the evolution of abortion-related disclosures since abortion became
legal in 1973. 32 Additionally, Section I.B examines the current split among
the Circuit Courts regarding which test should be applied to abortionrelated disclosures. 33 Lastly, Section I.C reviews the most recent Marylandspecific case, Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 34 the most recent Supreme Court case regarding abor24. Parental consent or involvement is required in thirty-seven states and a waiting period
after counseling is required in twenty-seven states. An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 18.
25. See infra Section I.A.
26. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
27. See infra Section I.B.
28. 879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018); see infra Section I.C.1.
29. 839 F.3d 823 (2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see infra
Section I.C.2.
30. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see infra Section I.C.3.
31. See infra Section II.A–C.
32. See infra Section I.A.
33. See infra Section I.B.1–2.
34. 879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018); see infra Section I.C.1.
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tion-related disclosures, NIFLA v. Becerra, 35 and the case below in the
Ninth Circuit. 36
A. The History of Abortion-Related Disclosures from Roe to Casey
Following the legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade, 37 legal battles
ensued testing the boundaries of this right. Cases before the Supreme Court
included issues regarding consent from spouses 38 and parents; 39 the use of
federal funds; 40 and the use of state-owned facilities and staff. 41 The case
history regarding abortion-related disclosures 42 is especially important given the Becerra ruling. 43
Initially following Roe v. Wade, the Court did not allow any additional
disclosure requirements to stand. 44 While the Court upheld a state law requiring informed consent from the person receiving the abortion in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 45 it struck down provisions of
an Akron ordinance in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health 46 requiring the physician performing the procedure to inform their

35. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see infra Section I.C.2.
36. 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018);
see infra Section I.C.3.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court legalized abortion based on the historical right of privacy it found to exist in the Constitution. Id. at 152–53. Specifically, the Court determined this
right of privacy “encompass[ed] a [pregnant person’s] decision whether or not to terminate [their]
pregnancy.” Id. at 153. However, the state still had a valid interest in preserving human life;
therefore, the right to abortion remains subject to limitations. Id. at 154.
38. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–69 (1976) (overturning
Missouri law requiring a married woman to get her husband’s consent for an abortion).
39. Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417, 423–24, 427 (1990) (overturning law requiring minors
to notify both parents to obtain an abortion and instituting a judicial bypass procedure for minors
to seek abortion without parental involvement).
40. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment restriction
on the use of Medicaid funds for abortion except in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest).
41. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (upholding the ban on
use of public employees and facilities to perform abortions).
42. The term “abortion-related disclosure” is used to encompass any requirement prior to an
abortion in which a pregnant person must receive mandatory counseling or information, undergo a
mandatory ultrasound, or wait a specific length of time between counseling and the procedure.
See, e.g., Counseling and Waiting Periods, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
(discussing states that require counseling and/or waiting periods before an abortion); Requirements for
Ultrasound, supra note 19 (detailing states that mandate ultrasounds before an abortion).
43. See infra Section I.C.
44. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983)
(affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of sections of the Akron ordinance regulating abortions). The ordinance required
parental consent for minors seeking abortions, informed consent for all seeking an abortion, a
twenty-four-hour waiting period, and the “humane and sanitary” disposal of fetal remains. Id. at
422–24 (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.16 (1978)).
45. 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
46. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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patient “of the status of [their] pregnancy, the development of [their] fetus,
the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional complications that
may result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies to provide
[them] with assistance and information with respect to birth control, adoption, and childbirth.” 47 The Court found that the information required was
“designed not to inform the [person]’s consent but rather to persuade [them]
to withhold it altogether.” 48 Additionally, the Akron ordinance restricted a
physician’s ability to determine what information was relevant to a particular patient. 49 Instead, the physician was hamstrung to provide potentially
irrelevant information, including what the Court described as “a ‘parade of
horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure.” 50
This logic led the Court to declare state laws requiring physicians to
relay very specific, and potentially misleading, information to their patients
prior to an abortion unconstitutional. 51 In Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 52 Pennsylvania passed legislation requiring physicians to inform their pregnant patients seeking abortions at least
twenty-four hours before consent is given that “there may be detrimental
physical and psychological effects,” that medical assistance benefits may be
available for the child’s care, and that the father of the child is liable to provide child support, among other requirements. 53 Justice Blackmun writing
for the majority stated, “Forcing the physician . . . to present the materials . . . to the [pregnant person] makes [them] in effect an agent of the
State . . . .” 54 Additionally, the Court concluded much of the information
that the law required the physician to discuss was not relevant to informed
consent and, therefore, “advance[d] no legitimate state interest.” 55
However, the momentum of the Court shifted in 1992 with Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 56 The case involved
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 57 which required informed
consent, mandatory disclosures regarding abortion and its alternatives by a
physician followed by a twenty-four-hour waiting period, informed consent
of a parent for a minor’s abortion with a judicial bypass option, a require-

47. Id. at 442 (citing AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(B)).
48. Id. at 444.
49. Id. at 444–45.
50. Id. at 445.
51. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (holding that a twenty-four hour waiting period was unconstitutional).
52. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
53. Id. at 760–61 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(b) (1982)).
54. Id. at 763.
55. Id.
56. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
57. 1982 Pa. Laws 476.
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ment for married women to certify that their husbands were informed of
their abortion, and reporting requirements for facilities that provided abortions. 58 The Court split into several different factions, and Justices
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy authored the plurality opinion. 59 Casey is
most well-known for establishing the undue burden test, which allows the
state to take steps to protect its interest in life and dissuade a person from
having an abortion provided that those steps do not impose a “substantial
obstacle.” 60 Due to the plurality, several sections of the opinion did not
gain the majority of the Court, 61 including the section related to the provision that required a physician to apprise the patient “of the nature of the
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’” 62 This provision also required the
physician to notify the patient of the availability of printed materials regarding the fetus’s development, child support requirements, and a list of adoption agencies. 63 Contrary to the Court’s previous ruling in Thornburgh, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy concluded that Pennsylvania’s
interest in protecting life allowed the physician disclosure requirements to
stand, as they were a “reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice.” 64
These Justices also state that Thornburgh and Akron went “too far” in finding a constitutional violation in what they describe as “the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational
age’ of the fetus.” 65 While Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania argued that the physician disclosure requirements violated their First
Amendment rights, 66 Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy indicated

58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
59. Id. at 843.
60. Id. at 877.
61. Id. at 841–42. There was no majority for Section IV, see id. at 869, 872 (rejecting the
trimester framework set forth in Roe v. Wade and discussing that the state’s interest may prohibit
or restrict abortions after viability); Section V.B, see id. at 881 (discussing the informed consent
requirement, including the twenty-four-hour waiting period); Section V.D, see id. at 899 (discussing the parental consent provision); or Section V.E, see id. at 900 (discussing the recordkeeping
and reporting requirements), of the opinion.
62. Id. at 881.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 883. In Thornburgh, a similar requirement was struck down; the majority found
that “[t]his type of compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent.” 476 U.S. at 764.
In Akron, while the informed consent requirements were very similar to those seen in Casey (development of fetus, physical and emotional complications, and the availability of agencies to help
if the pregnant person decides not to terminate the pregnancy), the Court found that these disclosure requirements went “beyond permissible limits.” 462 U.S. at 442–44.
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
66. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania argued that the requirements forced
the physicians “[u]nder duress of law” to “recite a litany of government-mandated information.”
Brief for Petitioner at 54, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91744, 91-902). Forcing the physician to relay specific information, no matter who the patient was
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that since physicians, within the practice of medicine, are “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,” no constitutional violation
occurred. 67 Under the newly introduced undue burden test, Justices
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy did not find the physician disclosure requirements to be a “substantial obstacle to a [person] seeking an abortion”
and, therefore, determined that the requirements did not constitute an undue
burden and were constitutional. 68
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, while joining Justices O’Connor,
Souter, and Kennedy for some sections of their opinion, both dissented regarding the section on the physician disclosure requirements. Justice Stevens found the disclosures not useful and, therefore, undue, as the statute
did not allow for differences in situation or education and instead required
the same information to be distributed to all patients across the board.69 He
cautioned that “[w]henever government commands private citizens to speak
or to listen, careful review of the justification for that command is particularly appropriate.” 70 Justice Blackmun, referencing sections of the Thornburgh majority opinion in his dissent, maintained that the physician disclosure requirements made the physician “in effect an agent of the State” and
that the required disclosure information was not relevant to the patient’s informed consent and, therefore, “advance[d] no legitimate state interest.” 71
While Casey clearly indicated a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to
abortion regulation, the federal circuit courts interpreted Casey’s impact in
different ways.
B. The Circuit Split Following Casey and the Introduction of the
Reasonableness Test
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey, a circuit split developed as to whether Casey established a test for abortion-related disclosures. 72 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits determined that Casey established a “reasonableness” test, in addition
to the undue burden test, specifically for abortion-related disclosures. 73
However, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Ciror what the individual circumstances were, went against the standard practice of the physician tailoring the information for each individual patient and their needs. Id. at 51.
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977)).
68. Id. at 884–85.
69. Id. at 921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 935–36 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1986)).
72. See NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 837 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (discussing the circuit split regarding the proper test to apply to an
abortion-related disclosure).
73. See infra Section I.B.1.
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cuits disagreed and did not believe that Casey established a test, instead using the intermediate scrutiny test for abortion-related disclosures. 74
1. The Eighth and Fifth Circuits Adopt the Casey Reasonableness
Test
The Eighth and the Fifth Circuits found that Casey established a test
for abortion-related disclosures based on the following line from the Casey
plurality opinion: “If the information the State requires to be made available
to the [pregnant person] is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may
be permissible.” 75
Additionally, as previously discussed, Justices
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy found that Thornburgh and Akron went
“too far” when the Court found these abortion-related disclosures, which
the Justices described as truthful and nonmisleading, to be unconstitutional. 76 These three Justices also specify that the physician’s free speech rights
are not violated by Casey’s abortion-related disclosure as it falls under the
purview of state regulation. 77 Following Casey, the Eighth and Fifth Circuit
courts interpreted this language to develop a “reasonableness” test, which
meant that future abortion-related disclosures only had to be considered
truthful and not misleading to be constitutional, with no other considerations. 78
In Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, & South Dakota
v. Rounds, 79 the Eighth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against a
South Dakota bill 80 that, among other requirements, specified that a physician must disclose to a patient “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of
a whole, separate, unique, living human being.” 81 The Eighth Circuit

74. See infra Section I.B.2.
75. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); see Planned
Parenthood of Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding
“Casey and Gonzales establish that . . . [the state] can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information”); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding under Casey and Gonzales that
“informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the [person]’s right to have an
abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures.”).
76. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
77. Id. at 884 (citations omitted).
78. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726 (upholding South Dakota’s abortion-related disclosure);
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (upholding Texas’s abortion-related disclosure).
79. 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008).
80. H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005).
81. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726 (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005)). Additionally, the South Dakota bill required the physician to inform the prospective patient that the
patient “ha[d] an existing relationship with that unborn human being,” and “[t]hat by having an
abortion, [their] existing relationship and [their] existing constitutional rights with regards to that
relationship will be terminated.” Id. (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005)). The
physician also had to inform the patient that an abortion had “statistically significant risk factors,”
including depression and increased risk of suicide. Id. (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess.
(S.D. 2005))
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agreed that requiring a physician to disclose certain information to a pregnant person before performing an abortion could implicate the physician’s
First Amendment rights; however, the court found that since physicians are
“subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,” a disclosure
requirement did not violate the First Amendment as long as the information
in the disclosure was truthful and not misleading. 82 Additionally, the court
wrote that the state’s interest and “profound respect for the life within the
[person]” 83 meant that the court could, and would, uphold an abortionrelated disclosure “even if that information might also encourage the patient
to choose childbirth over abortion.” 84
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit similarly reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction against a Texas law in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey. 85 This law required physicians to “perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, make audible the heart
auscultation of the fetus for the [person] to hear, and explain to [them] the
results of each procedure.” 86 Additionally, the law required a twenty-fourhour waiting period and other common informed consent requirements that
appeared across the country following the Casey ruling. 87 The Fifth Circuit
found that laws regarding abortion disclosures “are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of
compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny.” 88 Since the requirements of the bill, including the sonogram and
heartbeat, “are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information,” they
are considered reasonable and not infringements upon the physician’s First
Amendment rights. 89 The Fifth Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, quoted Casey regarding the state’s ability to “further the ‘legitimate goal of protecting
the life of the unborn’” 90 and upheld an abortion-related disclosure that required the physician to express the state’s preference for childbirth over
abortion. 91

82. Id. at 734–35, 738 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884, 882). The court also interpreted the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), to allow mandated disclosures to withstand First Amendment protections “even if that information might also
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.” Id. at 735.
83. Id. at 734 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157).
84. Id. at 734–35.
85. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
86. Id. at 573 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2011)).
87. The other requirements include completion of a form that the physician must maintain for
seven years and the provision of educational materials about how to “establish paternity and secure child support.” Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0123).
88. Id. at 576.
89. Id. at 578.
90. Id. at 575 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882).
91. Id.
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Under the Casey reasonableness test, as interpreted by the Eighth and
Fifth Circuits, all that is required to withstand a First Amendment challenge
is that an abortion-related disclosure contain information found truthful and
non-misleading. 92 Additionally, given the state’s interest in protecting life,
it is permissible for the disclosure to favor or encourage childbirth over
abortion. 93 However, not all of the federal circuits agree with this interpretation.
2. The Fourth Circuit Adopts the Intermediate Scrutiny Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed
with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits that Casey established a reasonableness
test to replace strict scrutiny regarding abortion-related disclosures and a
physician’s First Amendment rights. 94 Instead, the Fourth Circuit, and later
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, apply an intermediate scrutiny test. 95
When the First Amendment is implicated, different levels of scrutiny
may be applied to the law or regulation in question 96—rational basis, 97 intermediate scrutiny, 98 or strict scrutiny. 99 When a First Amendment case
applies intermediate scrutiny, it first determines whether the law or regulation in question is content-based or “draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” 100 While content-based laws are presumptively
unconstitutional, 101 Supreme Court precedent, such as Casey, recognized
that the state can nonetheless regulate physicians and their First Amendment speech regarding abortion. 102 The next inquiry is whether the law or
regulation is viewpoint neutral or viewpoint discriminatory; if a law or regulation is viewpoint discriminatory, it is “based on ‘the specific motivating
92. See supra notes 84 & 94 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 85–86 and infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
94. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).
95. Id. at 249; NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
96. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (“[B]ecause not every interference with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment, we must decide
at the outset the level of scrutiny applicable . . . .”).
97. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). Rational basis
requires only that the legislation rationally might have been carried out to meet a state interest. Id.
98. Also referred to as heightened scrutiny, the law “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). While the Supreme Court has utilized the intermediate scrutiny test in
relation to gender discriminatory laws, appellate courts have used it in First Amendment cases.
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248.
99. To survive strict scrutiny, the law or regulation must be ‘“narrowly tailored’ to achieve a
‘compelling’ government interest.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
100. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
101. Id. at 2226.
102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.’” 103 If a law or regulation involving speech by a professional, such as a physician, is found to
be both content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit outlines a continuum of First Amendment protected speech. 104 When a professional speaks to add to the public dialogue and no more, they are afforded
First Amendment rights as any other person who added to the public dialogue; to regulate this speech would require strict scrutiny. 105 However, as
discussed previously in Casey, the state also has the power to heavily regulate professional conduct, like medical treatment. In this case, the First
Amendment protections are significantly weaker, falling under rational basis. 106 Required disclosures, such as abortion-related disclosures, fall in between the two poles—while they are not public dialogue, they are also not
professional conduct. Given this midpoint, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
believe that intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate test to use when
analyzing the constitutionality of abortion-related disclosures. 107 This test
reviews the law or regulation to determine if it “directly advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.” 108
The Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court to utilize the intermediate scrutiny test for an abortion-related disclosure. Two years after the
Fifth Circuit ruled in Lakey, a similar state law came before the Fourth Circuit in Stuart v. Camnitz. 109 Like the Texas law, this North Carolina law
required physicians to “perform an ultrasound, display the sonogram, and
describe the fetus” in addition to offering the option to hear the heart
tone. 110 But the Fourth Circuit did not agree that Casey established a reasonableness test for physicians’ First Amendment rights when it came to
abortion-related disclosures; instead, the court interpreted Casey as stating
that in that particular case, the physicians’ First Amendment rights were not
103. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Reed finds that viewpoint-discriminatory laws or regulations are an
“egregious form of content discrimination” and are, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional. Id.
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).
104. See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053–55 (9th Cir. 2013) (outlining the protected
speech continuum for professionals). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
also subscribes to this continuum of speech used by the Ninth Circuit. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d
238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).
105. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1053.
106. Id. at 1055.
107. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (“Recognizing that the Requirement both compelled speech
and regulated the medical profession, the court applied neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis
review, but rather the intermediate scrutiny standard . . . .”); NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839
(9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
108. Harris, 839 F.3d at 841 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011)).
109. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). The state law in this case was from North Carolina. Id. at
242; see supra note 86 and accompanying text; and infra note 110 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 242–43.
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at risk. 111 In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit found that under the North
Carolina law, physicians’ First Amendment rights were implicated because
the physician was required to take actions and speak certain information,
whether or not they felt it was psychologically safe to do so with a particular patient and whether or not that patient wanted to hear what the physician
was saying. 112 The court conceded that the state may regulate the medical
profession; however, a physician’s First Amendment rights exist on a continuum between “public dialogue” and “regulation of professional conduct,”
necessitating different levels of scrutiny depending on the situation. 113
Here, the Fourth Circuit found that the North Carolina law was contentbased and, while admitting that the protection of life is a valid and important state interest, did not believe the law in question was drawn narrowly enough to avoid “impeding too greatly on individual liberty interests.” 114
The Fourth Circuit found the law exceeded the confines of the Pennsylvania
abortion-related disclosure law the Supreme Court found constitutional in
Casey. 115 The physician requirements imposed by the Pennsylvania law,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, “deviate[d] only modestly from traditional informed consent,” 116 while the additional requirements imposed by the North
Carolina law, specifically the forced sonogram viewing and verbal description, impermissibly “[t]ransform[] the physician into the mouthpiece of the
state.” 117 The requirements took what should be an open dialogue between
a physician and their patient and turned it into a lecture by the physician
with no possibility to frame the conversation with the information most relevant to that particular patient. 118 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held the
North Carolina law violated the First Amendment rights of the physicians

111. Id. at 249 “[T]he plurality simply stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.’ (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 884)).
112. Id. at 250. There were no exceptions listed in the law for the requirements, except for a
medical emergency. Id. at 243. The physician was required to continue sharing the required information even if the patient covered their eyes and ears. Id.
113. Id. at 248 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pickup v. Brown 740 F.3d 1208, 1227, 1229 (9th
Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit describes this continuum further. First Amendment protection is
greatest in the “public dialogue” side of the continuum and slides to “professional conduct,” which
includes forms of treatment, where the state’s power to regulate is greater. Harris, 839 F.3d at
839 (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29).
114. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246–50.
115. Id. at 250.
116. Id. at 252. Informed consent, established to ensure that patients make autonomous choices about their own body, requires that physicians give patients information regarding “the diagnosis, the prognosis, alternative treatment options (including no treatment), and the risks and likely
results of each option.” Id. at 251. In Casey, the abortion-related disclosures deviate from informed consent because they additionally require the physician to inform the person of the gestational age of the fetus and let them know of additional state materials they can review if they wish
regarding available resources if the person decides not to get an abortion. Id. at 252.
117. Id. at 253–54.
118. Id.
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and affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. 119 However, as discussed below, the Fourth Circuit came to a different conclusion
in Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore. 120
C. Abortion-Related Disclosure with a “Twist”: Requiring Disclosure
for Crisis Pregnancy Centers Instead of Abortion Providers
After Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, states often attempted to require
abortion providers to disclose information to a person seeking an abortion 121—especially after the change to the undue burden standard in Casey. 122 However, states and cities began requiring abortion-related disclosures on the “flip side”: Instead of requiring abortion providers to disclose
information to those seeking abortions, those organizations seeking to prevent and reduce abortions (namely, crisis pregnancy centers) were required
to disclose that abortions were available in other locations or were not
available at that location. 123 Specifically, this occurred in Baltimore, Maryland 124 and most recently in California. 125
1.

The Maryland Connection: Greater Baltimore Center for
Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore

Both Baltimore City and the State of California attempted to shift the
onus of the abortion-related disclosure from the previous model; instead of
tasking the abortion provider with delivering a variety of state-required
messaging regarding the risks of abortion, Baltimore City and California
required crisis pregnancy centers to inform their clients of services not provided by the centers. 126 However, both cases for the disclosure were ultimately unsuccessful.

119. Id. at 256.
120. 879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018).
121. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 422–24
(1983) (requiring the physician to “make certain specified statements to the patient”).
122. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 18 (highlighting the many states that require state-mandated counseling and other requirements prior to an abortion).
123. See, e.g., Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 879 F.3d 101,
106 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing the city’s requirement that crisis pregnancy centers post a notice in
their waiting room indicating they do not offer abortion services); NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823,
830 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom, NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (discussing the
state’s requirement that crisis pregnancy centers, along with other licensed and unlicensed pregnancy centers, display information regarding state abortion services).
124. See infra Section I.C.1.
125. See infra Section I.C.2–3.
126. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 879 F.3d at 106; Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at
2368.
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In 2009, Baltimore enacted City Ordinance 09-252 requiring any limited service pregnancy center to post a conspicuous disclaimer in the waiting room in both English and Spanish stating that the center “does not provide or make referral for abortion or birth-control services.” 127 Given the
clear targeting of limited service pregnancy centers (otherwise known as
crisis pregnancy centers), the ordinance was neither facility-neutral nor audience-neutral. 128 The Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, a
crisis pregnancy center that did not refer for abortions, filed an injunction,
citing First Amendment free speech violations. 129 The Fourth Circuit ultimately decided that the ordinance regulated neither commercial speech nor
professional speech. 130 It found the ordinance to be both content-based and
viewpoint-discriminatory, as it applied only to pregnancy-related service
facilities and no other parties. 131 Given these findings, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the ordinance under the strict scrutiny standard. 132 While the
court agreed that “[t]he City’s interests are plainly important,” they found a
lack of hard evidence proving the ordinance was necessary to correct the
effect of deceptive advertising on behalf of the crisis pregnancy centers. 133
Additionally, the court remained unconvinced that the City could not enact
less restrictive requirements to reach its goal, such as a public information
campaign, rather than requiring the crisis pregnancy centers to publish information counter to its mission. 134 Although the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, the Court granted certiorari for an abortion-related disclosure
case that also flipped the disclosure onto crisis pregnancy centers rather
than abortion providers in the 2017 term. 135

127. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 879 F.3d at 106 (quoting Balt. City
Health Code §§ 3-501 to 3-506 (2010)).
128. The ordinance defined “limited-service pregnancy center” as “any entity ‘whose primary
purpose is to provide pregnancy-related services’ . . . but ‘does not provide or refer for’ abortions
or ‘nondirective and comprehensive’ birth control.” Id. at 106 (quoting Balt. City Health Code
§ 3-501).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 108–09.
131. Id. at 112.
132. Id. at 111. The strict scrutiny test “requires that compelled disclosures be ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘weighty’ government interest.” Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 112.
135. Mayor of Balt. v. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2710
(2018); see infra Section I.C.3.
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NIFLA v. Harris: The Ninth Circuit Finds California’s
Abortion-Related Disclosure for Crisis Pregnancy Centers to
Withstand Intermediate Scrutiny

In NIFLA v. Harris, 136 which subsequently went to the Supreme Court
as NIFLA v. Becerra, 137 the onus of the abortion-related disclosure again
shifted from the abortion provider to crisis pregnancy centers. The California legislature passed the California Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“FACT Act”) to ensure that “[a]ll California [people], regardless of income, . . . have access to reproductive health
services.” 138 Research suggested that thousands of people were unaware of
public state-funded family planning programs, including abortion. 139 Due
to the time-sensitive nature of pregnancy, especially if the pregnant person
wishes to consider abortion, the legislature found the most effective way to
give pregnant people notice about state-funded programs was to require licensed pregnancy-related clinics to inform their pregnant clients of these
programs. 140 This “Licensed Notice,” to be posted conspicuously in a waiting area or given to each client in printed or digital form, read: “California
has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods
of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible [people]. To determine whether you qualify, contact the county social services office at [insert the telephone number].” 141 Additionally, the legislature found that crisis pregnancy centers, which “aim to discourage and prevent [people] from
seeking abortions,” interfered with a person’s “ability to be fully informed
and exercise their reproductive rights.” 142 These centers sometimes portrayed themselves as health clinics when they actually held no licensure
with the state. 143 To address this problem, the FACT Act required unlicensed clinics to provide a second notice, known as the “Unlicensed Notice,” to clients on site and in any advertising: “This facility is not licensed
as a medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical
provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.” 144
The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”), along with

136. 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
137. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
138. Harris, 839 F.3d at 829 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting FACT Act, A.B.
No. 775 §1(a), 2015 Cal. Stat. 5351, 5352).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 830.
141. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 2015 Cal Stat. 5351, 5353).
142. Id. at 829 (quoting Cal. Assem. Comm. on Health, Analysis, AB 775, 2015–2016 Leg.,
Reg. Sess., at 3 (2015).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 830 (quoting 2015 Cal. Stat. 5351, 5354).

2019]

ABORTION-RELATED DISCLOSURES

115

other crisis pregnancy center organizations, challenged the two notices as
unconstitutional on First Amendment free speech grounds. 145
The Ninth Circuit found that both the Licensed Notice and the Unlicensed Notice passed First Amendment requirements regarding abortionrelated disclosures. 146 The Ninth Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit, stated that
Casey did not establish a reasonableness rule regarding the level of scrutiny
courts must apply to abortion-related disclosures and instead applied the
continuum approach used in Stuart. 147 The court found the FACT Act to be
content-based but not viewpoint discriminatory. 148 While the Ninth Circuit
admitted that compelling the pregnancy-related facilities to post the Licensed or Unlicensed Notice when the facilities might not otherwise post
them “necessarily alters the content of the speech,” the Notices were not
viewpoint discriminatory because all pregnancy-related facilities had to post
them, regardless of their ideology or personal feelings towards abortion. 149
Following this determination, the court found that intermediate scrutiny was
appropriate for the Licensed Notice as it fell in the middle of the continuum, affording the medical professional some First Amendment protection
while recognizing that the protection is diminished within the confines of a
professional relationship. 150 Additionally, the Licensed Notice survived intermediate scrutiny since the state has substantial interest in the health of its
citizens and ensuring they have access to state-sponsored medical services
including abortion. 151 The Licensed Notice was drawn to achieve this state
interest because it only informed readers of the services and did not encourage their use. 152 While NIFLA argued that the state could find other ways
to disseminate the Licensed Notice information, such as a public information campaign, the Ninth Circuit found that given the time-sensitive nature of pregnancy, an effective way to let pregnant people know about the
services was to inform them anytime they went to a clinic.153 Additionally,
the court found that the Unlicensed Notice survived any level of review,
145. Id. at 831.
146. Id. at 841, 843.
147. Id. at 837–39.
148. Id. at 835.
149. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
150. Id. at 840.
151. Id. at 841.
152. Id. at 842.
153. Id. Additionally, since the court was using intermediate scrutiny, there was no requirement for the state to use the least restrictive means possible to communicate their message as there
had been in other cases reviewed under strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of
N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014) (striking down the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene’s regulation encouraging pregnant people to consult with a licensed provider
under strict scrutiny, stating that the government could use an advertising campaign); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 190–91 (4th Cir. 2013) (striking down a county ordinance similar to Evergreen under strict scrutiny, finding the government had “several options less
restrictive than compelled speech” (quoting Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 779 F. Supp. 2d
456, 469 n.9 (D. Md. 2011))).
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even strict scrutiny, since the state has a compelling interest to make sure its
citizens know whether a clinic is licensed or not before entrusting that clinic
with their wellbeing. 154 NIFLA appealed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
3. NIFLA v. Becerra: On Appeal, the Supreme Court Reversed the
Ninth Circuit but Failed to Resolve the Circuit Split Regarding
the Casey Reasonableness Test
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard NIFLA v. Becerra. 155 The Court determined that the Licensed
Notice constituted a content-based regulation of speech, as it “compell[ed]
individuals to speak a particular message” and, therefore, “alte[r] the content of [their] speech.” 156 The Court indicated that content-based regulations cannot be imposed by the state unless there is persuasive evidence of a
long-standing tradition of such restriction; in this case, the Court was not
persuaded. 157 The Court also failed to find that the notices fell under the
umbrella of commercial speech, another sub-category afforded less protection under the First Amendment. 158
However, even if a separate category of speech did exist and applied to
the notice, the Court found the Licensed Notice did not meet intermediate
scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny. 159 While the legislature’s stated goal was
to reach people who were unfamiliar with the state services, the Licensed
Notice only applied to pregnancy-specific clinics, not all clinics. 160 Given
this goal, why would the legislature require the notice only in a narrow subset of clinics? 161 Therefore, the Court found that NIFLA and the other petitioners were likely to succeed on the merits of their Licensed Notice challenge. 162
The Court found the Unlicensed Notice to be unjustified and unduly
burdensome. 163 The Court described the state’s justification for the notice
as “purely hypothetical” and found that imposing this notice requirement
only on unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics and not on other unlicensed
clinics distinguished between the speech of different speakers (or in this
case, different clinics), making it viewpoint discriminatory. 164 Additional154. Id. at 843.
155. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), rev’g NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016).
156. Id. at 2380 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
157. Id. at 2372.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2375.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2376.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2377.
164. Id. at 2377–78.

2019]

ABORTION-RELATED DISCLOSURES

117

ly, the Court found the Unlicensed Notice burdensome as the notice applied
to all print and digital advertising and one California county required disclosures to be in thirteen languages. 165 Therefore, the Court also found the
petitioners were likely to succeed on the merits of their Unlicensed Notice
challenge. 166
While the Supreme Court decided Becerra in the opposite fashion of
the Ninth Circuit, the Court did not resolve the circuit split regarding
whether Casey established a reasonableness test for physician abortionrelated disclosures. The number of these abortion-related disclosures grew
exponentially following Casey, but confusion remains regarding which disclosures are constitutional and which are not. 167 While the Supreme Court
could have taken Becerra as an opportunity to resolve the circuit split regarding whether Casey instituted a new test for abortion-related disclosures,
the Court did not resolve this split. 168 Additionally, as Baltimore City and
California have tried to flip abortion-related disclosures and place the onus
on those who wish to avoid or deter abortions rather than on those who
wish to perform or undergo an abortion, they have not been successful. 169
II. ANALYSIS
Given the lack of success in targeting abortion-related disclosures at
crisis pregnancy centers, 170 it may be time to consider a new and novel approach. The Maryland General Assembly should create a Pregnancy Disclosure, a written document to be distributed when a person is first diagnosed as pregnant or when a person first reports their pregnancy, that details
the full range of available resources and the potential risks of both abortion
and childbirth in order to fully inform a pregnant person of their options. In
Section II.A, this analysis begins with a discussion of the elements and
format of the Pregnancy Disclosure. 171 Section II.B then explains the precedents that indicate the constitutionality of the Pregnancy Disclosure. 172
Lastly, Section II.C discusses why the Pregnancy Disclosure has constitutional advantages. 173

165. Id. at 2378.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 24.
168. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
169. See, e.g., id. at 2378 (finding that NIFLA were “likely to succeed on the merits of their
claim that the FACT Act violates the First Amendment”); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 879 F.3d 101, 113 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that the city “fails to satisfy heightened First Amendment scrutiny”).
170. See supra note 169.
171. See infra Section II.A.
172. See infra Section II.B.1–2.
173. See infra Section II.C.
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A. Elements and Format of the Pregnancy Disclosure
Health care facility personnel or pregnancy-related facility personnel,
whenever a person is either first diagnosed as pregnant or first reports their
pregnancy, should provide the Pregnancy Disclosure in a written format.
While the written format still requires the facility personnel to provide information they may not agree with, it allows the pregnant person and the
facility personnel to engage in a conversation appropriate to the individual
pregnant person’s questions and concerns. 174 The facility personnel should
provide the Pregnancy Disclosure in the person’s preferred language and
may provide an electronic or digital copy unless the person requests a hard
copy. 175 The health care facility could mean any facility governed by the
Maryland Office of Health Care Quality176 or a licensed physician’s office
or practice. 177 Additionally, the requirements determining a pregnancyrelated facility should be similar to those found in California’s FACT Act
discussed in NIFLA v. Becerra to capture any place of business that may interact with pregnant people and fall outside of the health care facility category. 178 Therefore, the Pregnancy Disclosure will be facility-neutral, unlike
other abortion-related disclosures that targeted crisis pregnancy centers.179
The Pregnancy Disclosure will also be audience-neutral, as it will not target
pregnant people who have expressed their wish to have an abortion. 180
174. The lack of a required verbal disclosure by the physician differentiates the Pregnancy
Disclosure from the North Carolina law ruled unconstitutional in Stuart v. Camnitz, which required the physician to verbally describe the fetus in detail while displaying an ultrasound image,
even if the pregnant person did not want to hear or see it. 774 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2014).
175. Regarding translation, see MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 10-1103 (2018) for state services. The Pregnancy Disclosure could be provided through the Department of Health.
176. Such as freestanding birthing centers (MD. CODE REGS. 10.05.02 (2017)), Acute General
Hospitals and Special Hospitals (MD. CODE REGS. 10.07.01 (2018)), and Surgical Abortion Facilities (MD. CODE REGS. 10.12.01 (2017)).
177. Including physicians’ services (MD. CODE REGS.10.09.02 (2018)) and freestanding clinics (MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.08 (2018)).
178. If the facility provides two or more of the following, they should be considered a pregnancy-related facility and subject to the Pregnancy Disclosure requirements: (1) offers pregnancy
testing/diagnosis; (2) offers ultrasounds, sonograms, or prenatal care; (3) advertises or solicits patrons with offers to provide sonography, tests, counseling; (4) offers abortion services; (5) staff or
volunteers collect health information from clients. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369
(2018).
179. In Becerra, the FACT Act specifically attempted to regulate crisis pregnancy centers,
which the California State Assembly defined as “pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organizations that offer a limited range of free pregnancy options, counseling, and other services.” 138 S.
Ct. at 2368 (quoting WATTERS ET AL., PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS: ENSURING ACCESS AND
ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 4 (2011)). In Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns,
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Baltimore City ordinance applied only to “limited-service pregnancy centers” that provided pregnancy-related information but did not refer for abortions or
comprehensive birth control. 879 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting BALT. CITY HEALTH
CODE §§ 3-501–3-506 (2010)).
180. In Casey, Lakey, and Rounds, the disclosures in question were required of physicians before performing an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992);
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The Pregnancy Disclosure should include pregnancy-related resources
within either the county or the state, including but not limited to abortion
providers, crisis pregnancy centers, and adoption agencies, and provide the
names of the resources, services provided at each resource, and contact information. The Pregnancy Disclosure should also contain informed consent
information for both abortion and childbirth, including the scientifically
valid risks and potential side effects of both. 181 A physician or other health
care provider, before performing an abortion procedure or before acting as a
pregnant person’s obstetrician, nurse-midwife, or otherwise delivering a
baby should ensure that their patient has read and understood the information contained in the Pregnancy Disclosure regarding the upcoming procedure. 182 While these requirements necessitate health care providers passing on a fair amount of information on the state’s behalf, the Pregnancy
Disclosure will likely be constitutionally sound. 183
B. The Pregnancy Disclosure Meets Both the Reasonableness Test and
the Intermediate Scrutiny Test
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court decides if Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey established a new test
for abortion-related disclosures 184 or if the intermediate scrutiny test used
by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits is more appropriate, 185 the Pregnancy Disclosure is constitutional. The Pregnancy Disclosure does not discriminate
regarding what types of facilities must provide the Pregnancy Disclosure,
unlike the FACT Act in Becerra or the Baltimore City Ordinance in Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore. 186 While both of these laws targeted crisis pregnancy centers,

Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2012);
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008).
181. Currently, thirty states do require that information regarding the health risks of continuing a pregnancy are included in an abortion-related disclosure. Counseling and Waiting Periods
for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion. However, several states’ disclosures
include inaccurate or scientifically invalid information and risks associated with abortion. See
supra note 18.
182. This is standard for informed consent—to ensure that the patient read and understood the
risks and potential side effects of a medical procedure. Informed Consent, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited
Feb. 6, 2019).
183. Currently, a Maryland law exists stating that a provider or hospital cannot be required to
refer for abortion. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2018). However, it may be
overcome given the facility-neutral and audience-neutral approach of the Pregnancy Disclosure.
Both liberal and conservative state representatives have an interest in passing the Pregnancy Disclosure since it includes information about abortion services, but also includes information about
faith-based groups like crisis pregnancy centers and about the risks of abortion.
184. See infra Section II.B.1.
185. See infra Section II.B.2.
186. See supra note 179.
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the Pregnancy Disclosure expands to all pregnancy-related facilities and also other health care facilities that are not pregnancy specific. Instead of
warning those people going to crisis pregnancy centers, the Pregnancy Disclosure takes a holistic approach to educating pregnant people early regarding the available resources and risks of either abortion or childbirth. While
the Pregnancy Disclosure requires the facility personnel to deliver the
state’s message, doing so in a written format like the Pregnancy Disclosure
is less invasive to the facility personnel’s First Amendment rights than requiring a verbal disclosure. 187 Having defined the terms of the Pregnancy
Disclosure, it can be examined more closely under both the Casey reasonableness test and the intermediate scrutiny test.
1. The Pregnancy Disclosure Meets the Casey Reasonableness Test
Since It Is Truthful and Nonmisleading
Given that Maryland will most likely be subjected to the intermediate
scrutiny test, the Pregnancy Disclosure should stand. 188 However, even if a
future Supreme Court solidifies that Casey established a reasonableness
abortion-related disclosure test, the Pregnancy Disclosure should still surpass these test requirements. As previously discussed, 189 since physicians
are “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,”190 the Fifth
and Eighth Circuit Courts find that language in Casey established a reasonableness test that only requires the abortion-related disclosure to be truthful
and non-misleading to withstand a First Amendment claim. 191 In this case,
the Pregnancy Disclosure will contain only factual and scientifically valid
information regarding both abortion and childbirth risks. It will not contain
any encouragement regarding which path a pregnant person should choose.
While Casey states that the disclosure will be allowed even when “the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion,” 192 there should be no
encouragement of neither childbirth nor abortion in this Pregnancy Disclo-

187. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The coercive effects of the
speech are magnified when the physician is compelled to deliver the state’s preferred message in
his or her own voice. This Requirement treads far more heavily on the physicians’ free speech
rights than the state pamphlet provisions at issue in Casey.”).
188. Maryland is in the Fourth Circuit, which chose to use the intermediate scrutiny test and
found that Casey did not establish a new test for abortion-related disclosures. Stuart v. Camnitz,
774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).
189. See supra Section I.B.1.
190. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
191. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734 (8th
Cir. 2008) (finding South Dakota’s abortion-related disclosure to be truthful and nonmisleading);
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012)
(finding Texas’s abortion-related disclosure to be truthful and nonmisleading).
192. 505 U.S. at 882.
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sure. 193 Therefore, given the straightforward nature of the reasonableness
test, the Pregnancy Disclosure should be found constitutional.
2. The Pregnancy Disclosure Meets the Intermediate Scrutiny Test
Because There Is a Significant Government Interest and the
Disclosure Addresses That Interest
The Fourth Circuit upheld the intermediate scrutiny test for abortionrelated disclosures in Stuart v. Camnitz. 194 Therefore, given that Maryland
falls within the Fourth Circuit, it is most likely that the Pregnancy Disclosure would be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.
To begin, it first must be determined whether the law or regulation is
content-based. 195 Because the Pregnancy Disclosure requires all health care
facilities and pregnancy-related facilities to provide information that they
might not otherwise provide, it qualifies as content-based. 196 In this case,
the content-based nature of the Pregnancy Disclosure is not dispositive according to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. 197 The next point to consider is
whether the law is viewpoint discriminatory. 198 If the law is found to be
viewpoint discriminatory, it is presumptively unconstitutional. 199 In this
case, the Pregnancy Disclosure does not promote one ideological view over
another. 200 No viewpoint or encouragement is offered; rather, only resources and scientifically valid information regarding pregnancy, abortion,
and childbirth.
Since the Pregnancy Disclosure is content-based but viewpoint neutral,
the First Amendment analysis can proceed. On the continuum of First

193. This differentiates the Pregnancy Disclosure from another Maryland case, Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013), in which the county disclosure encouraged pregnant people to consult with a licensed health care provider.
194. See supra Section I.B.2.
195. “A regulation discriminates based on content when ‘on its face,’ the regulation ‘draws
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.’” NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 835 (9th
Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (quoting Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
196. In fact, no health care facility or pregnancy-related facility would be likely to provide all
of the information found in the Pregnancy Disclosure. It is likely that the abortion services providers would not normally provide information about crisis pregnancy centers and vice versa.
197. See, e.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (discussing that abortion-related disclosures that are
content-based may still be valid); Harris, 839 F.3d at 834 (finding content-based disclosures can
continue through the First Amendment analysis).
198. Viewpoint discriminatory means that the law is “based on ‘the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.’” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
199. Reed finds that viewpoint-discriminatory laws or regulations are an “egregious form of
content discrimination” and, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional. Id. (quoting Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 829).
200. While both abortion service providers and crisis pregnancy centers are listed in the information section of the Disclosure, and the risks of abortion are included in the informed consent
section of the Disclosure, there is no ideological view expressed.
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Amendment scrutiny methodology, the Pregnancy Disclosure falls in the
middle; while it does not constitute professional conduct or treatment, it is
also not public dialogue. 201 Substantial regulation is allowed since professionals are advancing the welfare of their patients, not contributing to public debate, when engaging in a patient-physician relationship. 202 Because
the Pregnancy Disclosure falls at the midpoint, the appropriate level of
scrutiny is neither strict scrutiny, used in a public dialogue context, or rational basis, which gives great state power and control. 203 Rather, the appropriate test is intermediate scrutiny, which requires that the Pregnancy
Disclosure advance a substantial government interest and that the disclosure
is drawn to achieve that interest. 204
The Pregnancy Disclosure advances a significant government interest
in making sure all pregnant people are aware of all available options regarding their pregnancy and are informed of the potential risks and side effects
of medical procedures such as abortion. As previously stated, fifty-eight
percent, or more than 70,000, of total pregnancies in Maryland were unintended in 2010; 205 when more than half of the pregnant population of the
state did not plan for that pregnancy, there is a high likelihood that some of
these pregnant people may be unaware of the options and resources. It is
clearly a significant government interest to ensure these pregnant Marylanders understand these options, including abortion, and the resources
available to them. Given the time sensitive nature of pregnancy, it is also
vital that pregnant people receive this information as soon as possible;
therefore, as reasoned in California’s FACT Act, the best way to reach these
pregnant people is through health care facilities or pregnancy-related facilities. 206 While the Pregnancy Disclosure is required more widely across all
health care facilities and pregnancy-related facilities unlike previous abortion-related disclosures, this audience-neutral and facility-neutral wide net
allows the pregnant person to be informed of all their options as early as
possible. 207 With the Pregnancy Disclosure, pregnant people are informed
of all their options and the risks of both abortion and childbirth as soon as
the pregnancy becomes known to the health care provider. Whether the
person decides to have an abortion or carry the child to term, the Pregnancy

201. See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053–55 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that there is a
middle ground for professionals such as physicians that falls between public dialogue and professional conduct).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
205. See KOST, supra note 2.
206. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2018).
207. Abortion-related disclosures like Pennsylvania’s in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey do not take effect until a person has expressed their wish to have an abortion. 505 U.S. at 844.
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Disclosure unveils valuable information and resources to make the decision
as soon as possible and with all the necessary information in a format that
does not encourage or discourage any path forward. Consequently, the
Pregnancy Disclosure advances a significant government interest, namely
the state’s interest in the public health of the pregnant population in the
state. From a public health perspective, the wide array of health facilities
and professionals included within the Pregnancy Disclosure, making it facility-neutral, should alert a large percentage of pregnant people early in
their pregnancy to important resources. 208 This allows the pregnant person
sufficient notice of their options and the resources available. The audienceneutral approach of the Pregnancy Disclosure also gets this vital information to all pregnant people, regardless of whether they consider an abortion or not. 209 The early months of a pregnancy are crucial when deciding
to terminate the pregnancy or to carry the fetus to term; abortion procedures
are simpler, less invasive, and cheaper in the earlier weeks and months 210
and, similarly, prenatal care, such as ensuring the appropriate amount of folic acid, is vital to the healthy development of a pregnancy that will be continued. 211 The earlier the pregnant people of Maryland receive this information, the earlier they can engage with whatever resources they may need
to help them make a decision and the quicker they can feel more in control
regarding what lies ahead. 212
Additionally, the Pregnancy Disclosure is drawn to achieve this state
interest in its pregnant population’s health by reaching the pregnant person
at the earliest possible point through a facility-neutral and audience-neutral
net of all health care facilities and pregnancy-related facilities. Therefore,
under the intermediate scrutiny test, the Pregnancy Disclosure does not violate the First Amendment.
208. In a survey, ninety-seven percent of practicing obstetrician-gynecologists encountered
patients seeking abortions. Debra B. Stulberg et al., Abortion Provision Among Practicing Obstetrician-Gynecologists, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 609, 611 (2011).
209. Currently, abortion-related disclosures do not occur until a pregnant person enters an
abortion clinic or other facility offering abortions and requests the procedure. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (requiring a disclosure when a person
wants to have an abortion, but not otherwise required for pregnant people at large).
210. First-trimester abortions carry minimal risk and there is almost no risk of future problems
such as infertility or ectopic pregnancy. GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: INDUCED ABORTION
UNITED
STATES
2
(2018),
IN
THE
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.
211. What Is Prenatal Care and Why Is It Important?, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NATIONAL
INST.
OF
CHILD
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
DEV.
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/conditioninfo/prenatal-care.
Additionally,
prenatal care helps reduce the risk of pregnancy complications and the fetus and infant’s risk of
complications, as well as ensure the pregnant person’s diet and medication usage is safe for the
fetus. Id.
212. “In the healthcare context, mandated disclosures can successfully preserve patient choice
and broader liberty interests, impart important dignitary values, and restore a semblance of control
to helpless-feeling patients.” Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24
STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 197 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
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C. Constitutional Advantages Make the Pregnancy Disclosure an
Attractive Option for the Maryland General Assembly
In addition to being constitutional under the reasonableness test and intermediate scrutiny test, the Pregnancy Disclosure has additional constitutional advantages. While abortion-related disclosures are often fought
through litigation by various groups, 213 in this case groups from both sides
of the debate can band together to form the Pregnancy Disclosure. Given
that it is facility-neutral and audience-neutral, in addition to providing information about both crisis pregnancy centers and abortion services, it
should find wide-ranging support. Additionally, the legislative process rather than legal challenges and litigation regarding abortion-related disclosures will allow Maryland citizens to share their thoughts and concerns with
their elected representatives regarding the content of the Pregnancy Disclosure. Working through the legislative process will signify that the people of
Maryland, through their representatives, support an inclusive and informational message to all pregnant people regarding all of their options.
III. CONCLUSION
Since the legalization of abortion in 1973 after Roe v. Wade, the permissibility of abortion-related disclosures has changed over time. 214 Given
the recent decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, 215 Maryland should institute a
novel approach to protect and inform its pregnant population. The Maryland General Assembly should pass a facility-neutral and audience-neutral
Pregnancy Disclosure that informs all pregnant people of the available resources and the scientifically valid risks of both abortions and childbirth.
This comprehensive document will fully inform and empower all pregnant
people to make their own best choice. The Pregnancy Disclosure should
pass constitutional muster under either the Casey reasonableness test, 216 if
the Court should declare it to be the test for abortion-related disclosures, or

213. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (describing
that Planned Parenthood initiated a lawsuit against the state regarding the spousal notification requirement); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (describing that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania sued for injunctive relief from the act passed by the Pennsylvania legislature);
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota & South Dakota filed a suit against the enactment of the South Dakota bill).
214. See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Stuart, 774 F.3d 238 (2014); Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (2012); Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (2008); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Thornburgh v. American
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
215. In which the Supreme Court struck down an abortion-related disclosure directed at crisis
pregnancy centers, rather than the “traditional” abortion-related disclosure allowed after Casey
directed at abortion providers. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
216. See supra Section II.B.1.
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the current Fourth Circuit precedent intermediate scrutiny test. 217 Additionally, the Pregnancy Disclosure has both constitutional and public health advantages beyond just properly informing the pregnant population 218—it
shows that Maryland residents wish for pregnant people to be fully informed about all of their options and resources from the earliest point, and
it staves off potential litigation regarding the policy reflected in the Pregnancy Disclosure. Ultimately, instituting the proposed Pregnancy Disclosure will better serve all future pregnant people in Maryland, especially
those with unintended pregnancies, by ensuring that every pregnant person
knows of the available resources and the potential risks. The Pregnancy
Disclosure will help avoid stories like those told by Sharon, 219 Cherisse, 220
and Sarah, 221 and instead allow every individual to make the best choice for
themselves and their loved ones.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra Section II.B.2.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra note 4.
See supra note 7.
See supra note 11.

